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JOURNAL

OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL

Tuesday - 4 August 1970

25X1 1. [] - JMM) Called Kenneth Harkins, staff of Chairman Celler's House Judiciary Subcommittee investigating charges against Justice Douglas. I told Harkins that in view of our understanding that regardless of the Subcommittee's decision, Minority Leader Ford would insist that all of the evidence in the case be made public, we could not provide a classified memorandum and would have to stand on the Director's letter to Chairman Celler of 15 July 1970. His response was a non-committal horse laugh.

25X1 2. [] - JMM) Met with Senator Henry M. Jackson (D., Wash.), and Dorothy Fosdick and Richard Perle, of the staff of Jackson's Subcommittee on National Security and International Operations, and briefed them on the latest information regarding the Soviet strategic missile tests. Jackson requested for his own background use only an all-source fact sheet giving the precise number of each type of Soviet ICBM complex operational and under construction.

I provided Jackson with copies of the material we had prepared for Senator Stennis and Senator Milton Young for possible use in the current military authorization debate. STATOTHR

STATOTHR Jackson expressed concern over information that Dr. [] STATOTHR [] had been trying to facilitate an export license to provide our CDC 6600 computer to the Soviets in exchange for access to their Linear Accelerator.

25X1 3. [] JMM) Provided Ed Braswell, Chief of Staff, Senate Armed Services Committee, with a revised version of the U-2 material for possible use of Senator Stennis in the current military authorization debate.

25X1 4. [] JMM) Discussed with Bill Woodruff, Counsel, Senate Appropriations Committee, the possibility of handling our budget in some way that would avoid the authorization process. He said there just wasn't any practical way of doing this--we can't bury our budget without creating a lot of new problems. Woodruff felt this whole issue should be deferred for the time being.

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Approved For Release 2003/09/30 : CIA-RDP72-00337R000100210032-0

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Office of Legislative Counsel
Washington, D. C. 20505

4 August 1970

TO: Mr. T. Edward Braswell
Chief of Staff
Senate Armed Services Committee

Ed:

Here is a substitute version of Tab F (the U-2 story) to replace the earlier version in the material we sent over Friday.

Also enclosed is info on the latest Soviet missile tests--although some of it has been publicized by DOD, the specific details are still sensitive, and we would hope discussion of these developments could be kept general.

John M. Maury
Legislative Counsel

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U-2 BACKGROUND

1. During the missile crisis of the early 1950s, classic intelligence collection efforts against the carefully guarded Soviet missile target were virtually useless. However, it had long been known that aerial photography of Russia would provide important information on such military targets.

2. After consulting all the experts, President Eisenhower directed the Director of Central Intelligence and the Secretary of the Air Force to collaborate in the secret development and procurement of a capability for overflight. Lockheed Corporation had already designed the basic concept of the U-2, which had been rejected by the Air Force as unsuitable for tactical intelligence needs. But, CIA believed it was the best available design for strategic overflights, primarily because of its unequalled altitude capability. The Air Force concurred.

3. From the very first consideration of the U-2 program it was recognized that security was all important, as it was estimated that the Russians, with the equipment they then had, could not shoot down the U-2 at altitude but that if they knew that the U-2 was being built and what its capabilities were they could develop surface-to-air missiles which would be effective.

4. CIA believed that its procurement methods would assure a high degree of protection and when the Bureau of the Budget took the initial position that the building of airplanes should be done by the Air Force, senior representatives of the Air Force agreed that their procurement methods probably could not assure adequate security and CIA's procedures would give much greater assurance of such protection. CIA, therefore, undertook the development and planning of the entire program for procurement and operation of the U-2.

5. A letter of intent was given to Lockheed at the end of December 1954, and the first plane flew in August 1955. This unprecedented speed, resulting from intensive supervision of the program, was important from a security point of view as the sooner the plane was operational the less opportunity would be given to the Russians to develop countermeasures.

6. The first USSR overflight was in July 1956. For four years the U-2 covered the length and breadth of the USSR, bringing back photographic coverage of hundreds of thousands of square miles, including most of the strategic areas.

7. Due to the elaborate security precautions taken by CIA in the procurement, testing, and operational stages, it was many months before the first inkling of the U-2's existence appeared in the western press. During this time the Russians were aware that overflights were being made, but it took them a considerable period of time to ascertain what the capabilities of the machine were and what countermeasures would be needed. Indeed, there is still a question whether it was not more luck than improved equipment which brought about the shoot down of Gary Powers in 1960, thus ending the USSR overflights.

8. Without CIA's concentration on strategic intelligence programs, its know-how in secure procurement and operations, and its streamlined management procedures, it is probable that the U-2 operation would not have taken place and the United States would have been without one of the most successful intelligence operations in history at a very critical time.

9. Aside from the resolution of the missile problem, the U-2 program produced an over-all evaluation of USSR atomic capability during the period 1956-1960, accurate prediction of the 1956 Middle East war through photography of military preparations, and positive identification of Soviet missiles in Cuba in 1962. These are but some of the most significant of the many, many contributions of the U-2 program.